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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Teachers not only educate our children, but also 
provide them with sources of care and comfort outside the 
home.  Recognizing that the threat of civil liability might 
discourage teachers and other public servants from taking on 
such significant roles, courts have developed a doctrine of 
qualified immunity that, in many instances, shields them from 
civil lawsuits.  But there are exceptions and this is one of 
those cases. 
 
 In January 2013, a teacher in the Philadelphia School 
District allowed a kindergarten student to leave his classroom 
with an adult who failed to identify herself.  The adult 
sexually assaulted the child later that day.  In the early hours 
of the next morning, a sanitation worker found the child in a 
playground after hearing her cries.  The child’s parent sued 
the teacher, who claims he is immune from suit.   
 
 We hold that the parent’s allegations sufficiently state 
a constitutional violation of the young child’s clearly 
established right to be free from exposure by her teacher to an 
obvious danger.  In short, we conclude that it is shocking to 
the conscience that a kindergarten teacher would allow a child 
in his care to leave his classroom with a complete stranger.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of 
qualified immunity. 
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I.   BACKGROUND 
 
 A.   Factual Background 
 
 Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss, 
the allegations are taken from the complaint and are assumed 
true for purposes of this appeal.  On an ordinary school day in 
January 2013, Christina Regusters entered W.C. Bryant 
Elementary School in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where Jane 
was enrolled as a kindergarten student.1  Regusters proceeded 
directly to Jane’s classroom, where she encountered 
Defendant Reginald Littlejohn, Jane’s teacher. Per 
Philadelphia School District policy,2 Littlejohn asked 
Regusters to produce identification and verification that Jane 
had permission to leave school.  Regusters failed to do so.  
Despite this failure, Littlejohn allowed Jane to leave his 
classroom with Regusters.  Later that day, Regusters sexually 
assaulted Jane off school premises, causing her significant 
physical and emotional injuries.   
 
                                              
1 We will refer to the child as “Jane” throughout this opinion.  
This name is fictitious and we use it for ease of reference. 
2 The complaint states that Philadelphia School District policy 
provides that only the principal or his/her designee, the 
assistant principal, or the teacher-in-charge may grant a 
release of students during the school day.  The policy also 
states that (i) under no circumstances may a pre-kindergarten 
through eighth grade student be released without a properly 
identified adult, (ii) the adult’s identification must be checked 
against school records, and (iii) the release must take place in 
the school office.  Compl. (J.A. Vol. II 58-67) ¶¶ 15-16. 
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 B.   Procedural Background 
 
 Jane’s parent and natural guardian, L.R., filed this civil 
rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Reginald 
Littlejohn in his individual capacity, the School District of 
Philadelphia, and the School Reform Commission of the 
School District of Philadelphia (collectively, the 
“Defendants”).  L.R. alleges that Littlejohn deprived Jane of 
her Fourteenth Amendment rights under a state-created 
danger theory.  Specifically, L.R. alleges that by releasing her 
daughter to an unidentified adult, Littlejohn created the 
danger that resulted in Jane’s physical and emotional harm.  
Defendants moved to dismiss under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, arguing that the complaint does not allege a 
constitutional violation and, even if it did, Littlejohn is 
entitled to qualified immunity.3 
 
 The District Court denied Defendants’ motion. It 
explained that “ordinary common sense and experience 
dictate that there is an inherent risk of harm in releasing a 
five-year-old [child] to an adult stranger who has failed to 
produce identification and authorization for release despite 
being asked to do so.”4  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm.5   
                                              
3 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
4 L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 60 F. Supp. 3d 584, 590 (E.D. 
Pa. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5 The District Court also held that L.R. sufficiently stated a 
claim for municipal liability against the School District and 
the School Reform Commission under a failure to train and 
supervise theory.  See id. at 599-601.  Defendants’ appeal 
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II.   JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We exercise appellate jurisdiction 
over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to the collateral order 
doctrine.  Under this doctrine, “a district court’s denial of a 
claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an 
issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the 
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of 
a final judgment.”6 “This is so because qualified 
immunity . . . is both a defense to liability and a limited 
entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of 
litigation.”7 Here, the disputed issues are whether the 
complaint sufficiently alleges a violation of a constitutional 
right and whether that right was clearly established at the time 
of the violation.  Thus, appellate review is appropriate.  Our 
review is plenary.8 
 
III.   DISCUSSION 
 
 The primary purpose of qualified immunity is to shield 
public officials “from undue interference with their duties and 
from potentially disabling threats of liability.”9  This 
immunity can be overcome, however, when public officials 
violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a 
                                                                                                     
concerns only the District Court’s denial of Littlejohn’s claim 
of qualified immunity. 
6 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).   
7 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
8 Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2003). 
9 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). 
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reasonable person would have been aware.10  In the words of 
the Supreme Court, qualified immunity protects “all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 
law.”11   
 
 To resolve a claim of qualified immunity, courts 
engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff 
sufficiently alleged the violation of a constitutional right, and 
(2) whether the right was “clearly established” at the time of 
the official’s conduct.12  “[W]hether a particular complaint 
sufficiently alleges a clearly established violation of law 
cannot be decided in isolation from the facts pleaded.”13  
Thus the sufficiency of L.R.’s pleading is both “inextricably 
intertwined with” and “directly implicated by” Littlejohn’s 
qualified immunity defense.14 
 
 A.   Substantive Due Process Claim under the  
  State-Created Danger Theory 
 
 The threshold question in any § 1983 lawsuit is 
whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a deprivation of 
a constitutional right.  L.R.’s claim invokes the substantive 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which “protects individual liberty against 
certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the 
                                              
10 Id. at 818. 
11 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
12 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citing 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). 
13 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 673. 
14 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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procedures used to implement them.”15  In DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,16 the 
Supreme Court explained that “nothing in the language of the 
Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, 
liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private 
actors.”17  Rather, the purpose of the Clause is “to protect the 
people from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] 
[the people] from each other.”18  Applying this principle, the 
Court held that state social workers did not deprive four-year-
old Joshua DeShaney of substantive due process when they 
failed to remove him from a physically abusive household, 
despite their ongoing knowledge of suspected abuse by his 
father.19  The Court held that, “[a]s a general matter . . . a 
State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence 
simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process 
Clause.”20  It suggested, however, that the result may have 
been different had the State played a role in creating or 
enhancing the danger to which Joshua was exposed.21  
 
 Building off that concept, we and other circuits have 
adopted a “state-created danger” exception to the general rule 
                                              
15 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
16 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
17 Id. at 195.   
18 Id. at 196 (emphasis added). 
19 Id. at 201-02. 
20 Id. at 197.   
21 See id. at 201 (“While the State may have been aware of the 
dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part 
in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any 
more vulnerable to them.”). 
9 
 
that the Due Process Clause imposes no duty on states to 
protect their citizens from private harm.22  In Bright v. 
Westmoreland County,23 we clarified the elements necessary 
to successfully plead a state-created danger claim: 
 
1. the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable 
and fairly direct; 
2. a state actor acted with a degree of 
culpability that shocks the conscience; 
3. a relationship between the state and the 
plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a 
foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts, or 
a member of a discrete class of persons 
subjected to the potential harm brought 
about by the state’s actions, as opposed to a 
member of the public in general; and 
4. a state actor affirmatively used his or her 
authority in a way that created a danger to 
the citizen or that rendered the citizen more 
vulnerable to danger than had the state not 
acted at all.24 
                                              
22 See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1211 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“[W]e hold that the state-created danger theory is a viable 
mechanism for establishing a constitutional claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.”). 
23 443 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2006). 
24 Id. at 281 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 For the reasons set forth below, we hold that L.R. has 
sufficiently alleged all four of these elements and has 
therefore sufficiently pled a substantive due process violation.   
 
  i.   Affirmative Use of Authority Creating 
   or Increasing Danger 
 
 We begin with the fourth element, as it is typically the 
most contested.  This element asks whether the state’s 
conduct created or increased the risk of danger to the plaintiff.  
As we noted in Bright, “[i]t is misuse of state authority, rather 
than a failure to use it, that can violate the Due Process 
Clause.”25  
 
 This element is often contested because of the inherent 
difficulty in drawing a line between an affirmative act and a 
failure to act.26  Often times there is no clear line to draw; 
                                              
25 Id. at 282. 
26 See, e.g., Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 179 (3d Cir. 
2013) (en banc) (“[M]erely restating the Defendants’ inaction 
as an affirmative failure to act does not alter the passive 
nature of the alleged conduct.”); Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 
298, 312 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Sanford has attempted 
to ‘recharacterize’ [the school guidance counselor’s] failures 
as ‘affirmative actions.’  We believe that this case is more 
about [her] failure to prevent Sanford’s death.”); D.R. by L.R. 
v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 
1364, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“Accepting the 
allegations as true, [namely], that one school defendant was 
advised of the misconduct and apparently did not investigate, 
they show [inaction] but they do not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation.”). 
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virtually any action may be characterized as a failure to take 
some alternative action.27  For example, Defendants attempt 
to reframe Littlejohn’s alleged actions as inactions, or 
failures.  They argue that Littlejohn’s failure to follow School 
District policy, failure to obtain proper identification from 
Regusters, and failure to obtain verification from Regusters 
that Jane had been permitted to leave school are not 
affirmative acts.  This strategy is unavailing. 
 
 Rather than approach this inquiry as a choice between 
an act and an omission, we find it useful to first evaluate the 
setting or the “status quo” of the environment before the 
alleged act or omission occurred, and then to ask whether the 
state actor’s exercise of authority resulted in a departure from 
that status quo.  This approach, which is not a new rule or 
concept but rather a way to think about how to determine 
whether this element has been satisfied, helps to clarify 
whether the state actor’s conduct “created a danger” or 
“rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the 
state not acted at all.”28   
 
 The setting here is a typical kindergarten classroom.  
Children in this setting are closely supervised by their 
teacher.  Their freedom of movement is restricted.  Indeed, 
they are not likely to use the bathroom without permission, 
much less wander unattended from the classroom.  In the 
classroom, the teacher acts as the gatekeeper for very young 
children who are unable to make reasoned decisions about 
when and with whom to leave the classroom.  Viewed in this 
                                              
27 See Morrow, 719 F.3d at 198 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
28 Bright, 443 F.3d at 281. 
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light, Jane was safe in her classroom unless and until her 
teacher, Littlejohn, permitted her to leave.   
 
 We can therefore easily distinguish Littlejohn’s 
conduct from the state actors’ conduct in DeShaney.  The 
Supreme Court’s focus in DeShaney was on the State’s failure 
to remove Joshua a second time from a situation it had reason 
to believe was dangerous, meaning the State’s decision to 
leave Joshua with his father was a maintenance of the status 
quo.  Moreover, in responding to the argument that the State’s 
action in previously intervening and then returning Joshua to 
his father gave rise to an affirmative duty to protect and 
remove him again, the Court further observed: “That the State 
once took temporary custody of Joshua does not alter the 
analysis, for when it returned him to his father’s custody, it 
placed him in no worse position than that in which he would 
have been had it not acted at all.”29  In other words, had the 
State done nothing, Joshua would have been in the same 
dangerous position.  The setting here, by contrast, was a 
kindergarten classroom where students presumably were safe 
from outside dangers.  When Littlejohn allowed Jane to leave 
the classroom with an adult who failed to produce proper 
identification or verification, he exposed Jane to a danger she 
would not have otherwise encountered.  
 
 We can also distinguish this case from our decision in 
Morrow v. Balaski,30 where we declined to find a state-
created danger in a school setting.  In Morrow, two high 
school students sued their school for failing to protect them 
from another student who was bullying them persistently.  
                                              
29 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. 
30 719 F.3d 160. 
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The school at one point temporarily suspended the bully but 
then allowed her to return to school, contrary to a school 
policy requiring expulsion of students adjudicated “guilty of a 
crime.”31  We held that the school’s failure to enforce its own 
disciplinary policy was not equivalent to an “affirmative 
act.”32 Thus, Morrow paralleled DeShaney in that 
maintenance of the status quo was insufficient to create 
liability. 
 
 This case is different.  Littlejohn’s actions resulted in a 
drastic change to the classroom status quo, not a maintenance 
of a situation that was already dangerous.  And unlike in 
Morrow, the presence or absence of a school policy is largely 
irrelevant to L.R.’s claim.  Littlejohn’s actions in asking 
Regusters for proper identification and verification, and then 
permitting Jane to leave with Regusters despite her failure to 
produce either, amounted to an affirmative misuse of his 
authority as Jane’s teacher and “gatekeeper.” 
 
 Defendants contend that there is no constitutional right 
to have a school official intervene to prevent an unauthorized 
person from removing a child from school.  But this was not 
just a failure to intervene.  Under the facts as pled, Littlejohn 
had the authority to release Jane from his classroom and used 
it. By allowing Jane to leave his classroom with an 
unidentified adult, Littlejohn “created or increased the risk [of 
harm] itself.”33   
                                              
31 Id. at 178. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 186 (Ambro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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 We find clear parallels between this case and our 
seminal state-created danger case, Kneipp v. Tedder.34  There, 
police officers stopped a couple walking home from a tavern, 
released the husband first to relieve the babysitter, and then 
left the visibly intoxicated wife to walk home alone in the 
cold.  Police later discovered the wife unconscious at the 
bottom of an embankment near her home.  She suffered 
permanent brain damage as a result of her exposure to the 
cold.  We concluded that the officers created a dangerous 
situation or at least made the intoxicated woman more 
vulnerable to danger.  This was because the officers chose to 
displace the caretaker of someone who was clearly unable to 
care for herself.  Having taken on responsibility for the 
woman’s wellbeing, the officers thereafter abandoned it and, 
in so doing, subjected a vulnerable individual to an obvious 
risk of harm—walking home alone in the cold while highly 
intoxicated.   
 
 The dynamic of a kindergarten classroom is similar.  
The state is responsible for the safety of very young children 
unable to care for themselves.  Indeed, it is a responsibility 
the state undertakes when young children are left in its care.  
When Littlejohn surrendered that responsibility by releasing 
Jane to an unidentified adult, thereby terminating her access 
to the school’s care, he affirmatively misused his authority 
just as culpably as the officers in Kneipp misused theirs.  
 
 Our decision in Horton v. Flenory35 is similarly 
instructive.  In that case, a police officer intervened in a 
dispute between a night club owner and a crime suspect, then 
                                              
34 95 F.3d 1199. 
35 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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allowed the night club owner to interrogate the suspect, 
leading to the suspect’s death.  We explained that the officer’s 
action in delegating his authority to the night club owner was 
“anything but passive,” as he “used his official status to 
confirm that [the night club owner] was free to continue the 
custodial interrogation” despite signs of physical 
mistreatment.36  In both Horton and this case, the particular 
responsibilities that were relinquished—interrogating 
suspects and protecting the safety of kindergarteners—were 
an integral part of the state actor’s job functions.  In both 
cases, the state actor handed over their responsibility to a 
private actor who, under the circumstances, posed an obvious 
risk of harm to the plaintiff.  Such actions are an affirmative 
misuse of state authority. 
 
  ii.   Foreseeable and Fairly Direct Harm 
 
 Next, we ask whether “the harm ultimately caused was 
a foreseeable and a fairly direct result of the state’s actions.”37  
L.R. alleges that Littlejohn “w[as] aware that releasing pupils 
to unidentified and otherwise unverified adults would result 
in harm to those pupils, including but not limited to sexual 
assault.”38  Defendants counter that the complaint is devoid of 
any facts that support the inference that Littlejohn could have 
known of Regusters’ intent to harm Jane.  That is not the 
appropriate inquiry.  Rather, the plaintiff must only “allege an 
awareness on the part of the state actors that rises to the level 
of actual knowledge or an awareness of risk that is 
                                              
36 Id. at 458. 
37 Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 908 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
38 Compl. ¶ 39. 
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sufficiently concrete to put the actors on notice of the 
harm.”39  We think the risk of harm in releasing a five-year-
old child to a complete stranger was obvious. 
 
 A comparison of Kneipp with our decision in Morse v. 
Lower Merion School District40 illustrates this concept.  In 
Kneipp, we explained that a highly intoxicated woman was 
“more likely to fall and injure herself if left unescorted than 
someone who was not inebriated,”41 and we indicated that the 
police officers’ “ordinary common sense and experience” 
sufficiently informed them of this risk.42  By contrast, we held 
in Morse that school officials could not have foreseen that 
allowing construction workers to leave the school’s rear 
entrance unlocked would result in the fatal shooting of a 
teacher by a trespasser.  We explained that there was no 
allegation that the school was aware of the assailant or 
anyone else posing a credible threat of violence to persons 
inside the school.  Rather, the only facts alleged that would 
have alerted school officials to any danger were that there had 
been “previous ‘security breaches’ by unnamed persons” and 
the assailant had been seen loitering in the school area the 
week before the shooting.43  This, we held, was not enough to 
                                              
39 Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 238 (3d Cir. 
2008) (emphasis added). 
40 132 F.3d 902. 
41 Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208. 
42 Phillips, 515 F.3d at 237 (citing Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208); 
cf. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 590 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(noting the “inherent danger facing a woman left alone at 
night in an unsafe area is a matter of common sense”). 
43 Morse, 132 F.3d at 908. 
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warn officials that a person “would enter the school in search 
of a victim.”44   
 
 Here, it was foreseeable that releasing a young child to 
a stranger could result in harm to the child.  This inherent risk 
is not only a matter of experience as a teacher in charge of a 
kindergarten classroom, but, as in Kneipp, it is also a matter 
of common sense.  Regardless of which of the many apparent 
risks of harm—whether kidnapping, child pornography, 
human trafficking, sexual assault or some other violation—
came to pass, Littlejohn knew, or should have known, about 
the risk of his actions. 
 
 We also conclude that the harm ultimately caused to 
Jane was a fairly direct result of Littlejohn’s conduct.  We 
have explained that, although this inquiry is fact-specific, “a 
distinction exists between harm that occurs to an identifiable 
or discrete individual . . . and harm that occurs to a ‘random’ 
individual with no connection to the harm-causing party.”45  
In Morse, we declined to find the school’s decision to allow 
the back door to remain open to be the “catalyst for the 
attack” on the teacher because “[t]he causation, if any, [was] 
too attenuated.”46  Here, randomness and attenuation are not 
in play.  Littlejohn released Jane directly to the unidentified 
adult who sexually assaulted her the same day.  On the facts 
as pled, Littlejohn’s actions were indeed the “catalyst for the 
attack.” 
 
                                              
44 Id. 
45 Phillips, 515 F.3d at 239. 
46 Morse, 132 F.3d at 909-10. 
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  iii.   Conscience-Shocking Conduct 
 
 We next consider whether Littlejohn’s actions “shock 
the conscience.”  The Supreme Court has emphasized that the 
“touchstone of due process” is protection against arbitrary 
government action.47  Government action is “arbitrary in the 
constitutional sense”48 when it is “so egregious, so 
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the 
contemporary conscience.”49   
 
 The level of culpability required for behavior to shock 
the conscience largely depends on the context in which the 
action takes place.  In a “hyperpressurized environment,” 
such as a high-speed police chase, intent to harm is 
required.50  But in situations “where deliberation is possible 
and officials have the time to make ‘unhurried judgments,’ 
deliberate indifference is sufficient.”51  On the facts as pled, 
the appropriate culpability standard here is deliberate 
indifference, since there is nothing to indicate that Littlejohn 
faced circumstances requiring him to make a quick decision.  
We have defined deliberate indifference as requiring a 
“conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm.”52  
That is, “deliberate indifference might exist without actual 
                                              
47 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
48 Id. at 846 (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 129). 
49 Id. at 847 n.8. 
50 Sanford, 456 F.3d at 309. 
51 Id. 
52 Vargas v. City of Philadelphia, 783 F.3d 962, 973-74 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (quoting Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 
57, 66 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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knowledge of a risk of harm when the risk is so obvious that 
it should be known.”53   
 
 As we have already explained, the risk of harm in 
releasing a five-year-old child to an unidentified, unverified 
adult is “so obvious” as to rise to the level of deliberate 
indifference.  The fact that there was a school policy in place 
prohibiting the release of pre-kindergarten through eighth 
grade students to an adult without proper documentation 
tends to show that school officials were aware that releasing a 
young child to a stranger is inherently dangerous.  What is 
more, whether or not that policy existed, the fact that 
Littlejohn asked Regusters for her identification illustrates 
that Littlejohn himself was indeed aware of the risk of harm 
in releasing Jane to a stranger, even if he was unaware of 
Regusters’ specific criminal intent.  That he still allowed Jane 
to leave despite Regusters’ failure to produce identification or 
verification, we think, rises to conscience-shocking behavior.   
 
 To support their contention that Littlejohn’s conduct 
could not shock the conscience, Defendants direct us to Doe 
ex rel. Magee v. Covington County School District,54 a Fifth 
Circuit case with some factual similarity to this case.  In Doe, 
school employees on six separate occasions allowed a nine-
year-old student to be checked out from school by a man 
claiming to be her father but who bore no relationship to her 
and was not listed on her check-out form.  On each occasion, 
the man sexually assaulted the young student and then 
returned her to school.  The Fifth Circuit concluded that, even 
                                              
53 Phillips, 515 F.3d at 241 (quoting Sanford, 456 F.3d at 
309). 
54 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
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assuming it recognized a state-created danger theory (to date 
it has not officially adopted this doctrine), the allegations 
failed because the complaint did “not allege that the school 
knew about an immediate danger to [the student’s] safety.”55  
By contrast, we are comfortable concluding that Littlejohn’s 
conduct in releasing Jane to an adult who failed to identify 
herself demonstrated a “conscious disregard of a substantial 
risk of serious harm.”56   
 
  iv.   Foreseeable Victim 
 
 The “foreseeable victim” element requires that some 
sort of relationship exist between the state actor and the 
plaintiff such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the 
state actor’s conduct.57  This element is satisfied easily here.  
                                              
55 Id. at 866. 
56 Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973-74 (quoting Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 
66 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
57 A “special relationship” is not required.  Indeed, this is an 
entirely separate theory on which to base a substantive due 
process claim, applicable when “the State takes a person into 
its custody and holds him there against his will.”  Morrow, 
719 F.3d at 167 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200).  In 
the public high school context, we have explained that 
compulsory attendance laws and in loco parentis authority do 
not give rise to a special relationship between schools and 
their students.  Id. at 171-72; Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371-
72.  In Morrow, however, we left open the possibility that a 
special relationship between a school and its students could 
arise under certain “unique and narrow circumstances,” 719 
F.3d at 171, as when a school locks classroom doors or 
otherwise imposes limitations on a student’s “freedom to act 
21 
 
Jane was a member of the discrete class of kindergarten 
children for whose benefit the School District’s release policy 
had been instituted.  In this sense, Jane was a foreseeable 
victim of Littlejohn’s actions. 
 
 For these reasons, we conclude that L.R. has 
sufficiently alleged all the elements of a state-created danger 
claim. 
 
 B.   Whether the Right was Clearly Established 
 
 Having concluded that L.R. has sufficiently alleged a 
violation of her daughter’s substantive due process rights, we 
next ask whether the right was clearly established at the time 
of Littlejohn’s actions.  We conclude it was.  “A Government 
official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the 
time of the challenged conduct, ‘the contours of a right are 
sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”58  The 
                                                                                                     
on his own behalf.”  Id. at 181 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. 
at 200).  We have never addressed the special relationship 
theory in the context of a school’s youngest and most 
vulnerable students.  Although we decline to do so here, as 
L.R. does not raise this claim, we note that, at some point, the 
age and/or dependency of certain students in combination 
with restraints a school may place on its students may indeed 
forge a “special relationship.”  See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 
430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (“Except perhaps when very young, 
the child is not physically restrained from leaving school 
during school hours . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
58 al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 
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ultimate question is whether the state of the law when the 
offense occurred gave Littlejohn “fair warning that [his] 
alleged treatment of [Jane] was unconstitutional.”59  We look 
first to applicable Supreme Court precedent.  “Even if none 
exists, it may be possible that a ‘robust consensus of cases of 
persuasive authority’ in the Court[s] of Appeals could clearly 
establish a right for purposes of qualified immunity.”60   
 
 Defining the right at issue is critical to this inquiry.  
We must frame the right “in light of the specific context of 
the case, not as a broad general proposition.”61  “The 
dispositive question is whether the violative nature of 
particular conduct is clearly established.”62  “This is not to 
say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity 
unless the very action in question has previously been held 
unlawful.”63 The Supreme Court has explained that, 
“[a]lthough earlier cases involving fundamentally similar 
facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion 
that the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to 
such a finding.”64  Indeed, the Court has made clear that 
“officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates 
established law even in novel factual circumstances.”65  
                                              
59 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). 
60 Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 
F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Taylor v. Barkes, 135 
S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam)). 
61 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 
62 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
63 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. 
64 Hope, 536 U.S. at 741 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
65 Id. (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)). 
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 We stressed this concept in Estate of Lagano v. Bergen 
County Prosecutor’s Office.66  There too the plaintiff filed a 
§ 1983 lawsuit under the state-created danger theory, 
claiming that police officers’ improper disclosure of Lagano’s 
status as a confidential informant ultimately led to his murder.  
After defining the right at issue as “a confidential informant’s 
constitutional right to nondisclosure,” the district court 
explained that there was no binding precedent acknowledging 
such a right in the state-created danger context and, 
accordingly, it granted the officers’ qualified immunity.67  We 
vacated that decision.  We explained that the district court’s 
“unduly narrow construction of the right at issue” missed the 
mark, and exact congruence between prior cases and the 
current case was not required.68  Rather, the proper inquiry 
was “whether the facts averred by the Estate fall within the 
elements of the state-created danger theory, and whether it 
would be clear to a reasonable officer that the alleged 
disclosure was unlawful under the circumstances.”69 
 
 Defendants argue that the District Court defined Jane’s 
right at the highest level of generality: “[Jane’s] Fourteenth 
Amendment right to bodily integrity . . . under the state-
created danger theory.”70  We agree that this definition is too 
                                              
66 769 F.3d 850 (3d Cir. 2014). 
67 Id. at 859. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Mammaro, 
814 F.3d at 169 (explaining that, in defining the right at issue, 
the court must “consider the substantive due process right of 
Mammaro as a parent in light of the specific allegations in her 
amended complaint”). 
70 L.R., 60 F. Supp. 3d at 596.   
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broad.  Individuals indeed have a broad substantive due 
process right to be free from “unjustified intrusions on 
personal security.”71  For example, the Supreme Court has 
described this “historic liberty interest” as “encompass[ing] 
freedom from bodily restraint and punishment.”72  In light of 
the specific allegations in the complaint, however, the right at 
issue here is an individual’s right to not be removed from a 
safe environment and placed into one in which it is clear that 
harm is likely to occur, particularly when the individual may, 
due to youth or other factors, be especially vulnerable to the 
risk of harm.  Framed in this way, and surveying both our 
case law and that of our sister circuits, we conclude that this 
right was clearly established at the time of Littlejohn’s 
actions.  Although there is no case that directly mirrors the 
facts here, as in Estate of Lagano, there are sufficiently 
analogous cases that should have placed a reasonable official 
in Littlejohn’s position on notice that his actions were 
unlawful.   
 
 Our decision in Kneipp is key.  There, the officers’ 
decision to separate an intoxicated woman from her caretaker 
at the time, her husband, and the subsequent abandoning of 
the woman in her vulnerable state, led us to conclude that the 
officers could be liable for creating or enhancing the danger 
to which the woman was exposed.  Similarly, in Rivas v. City 
of Passaic,73 we held that emergency medical technicians 
who told police officers that a man in the midst of a seizure 
had assaulted them, but failed to tell them about the man’s 
medical condition, could have created or enhanced the danger 
                                              
71 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673. 
72 Id. at 673-74. 
73 365 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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that ultimately led to his death.74  We explained that, at the 
time of the defendants’ actions, it was clearly established that 
“state actors may not abandon a private citizen in a dangerous 
situation, provided that the state actors are aware of the risk 
of serious harm and are partly responsible for creating the 
opportunity for that harm to happen.”75   
 
 Other circuits have come to similar conclusions under 
analogous circumstances. For example, in White v. 
Rochford,76 the Seventh Circuit held that police officers who 
“abandon children and leave them in health-endangering 
situations after having arrested their custodian and thereby 
deprived them of adult protection” violate the children’s 
“right to be free from unjustified intrusions upon physical and 
emotional well-being.”77 There, officers arrested the 
children’s uncle for drag racing, then left the children with the 
immobilized car on a major highway on a cold evening.78  
The concurring judge explained that arresting the uncle 
removed the children’s only protection against danger, and by 
not providing any alternative protection, the officers 
unnecessarily exposed the children to obvious hazards.79  As 
the Seventh Circuit later articulated in Bowers v. DeVito,80 
“[i]f the state puts a [person] in a position of danger from 
private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be 
heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an 
                                              
74 Id. at 194-95. 
75 Id. at 200. 
76 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). 
77 Id. at 382, 386.    
78 Id. at 382. 
79 Id. at 387-88 (Tone, J., concurring). 
80 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.”81  
Similarly, in Wood v. Ostrander,82 the Ninth Circuit held that 
a police officer who left a female passenger stranded late at 
night in a high-crime area after arresting the driver violated 
her constitutional right to personal security.83 The court 
explained that “the inherent danger facing a woman left alone 
at night in an unsafe area is a matter of common sense.”84 
 
 This notion is not limited to circumstances in which 
police officers abandon private citizens in dangerous 
situations.  In Currier v. Doran,85 the Tenth Circuit held that 
the plaintiff sufficiently pled a state-created danger claim 
when state social workers failed to investigate numerous 
allegations of child abuse and recommended that the 
children’s abusive father assume legal custody.86  In denying 
                                              
81 Id. at 618. 
82 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989). 
83 Id. at 590 (“The fact that [the officer] arrested [the driver], 
impounded his car, and apparently stranded Wood in a high-
crime area at 2:30 a.m. distinguishes Wood from the general 
public and triggers a duty of the police to afford her some 
measure of peace and safety.”). 
84 Id. 
85 242 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2001). 
86 Id. at 919-20.  In distinguishing these circumstances from 
DeShaney, the Tenth Circuit explained that, “[i]n this case, 
Anthony and Latasha were removed from their mother and 
placed with their father. In DeShaney, Joshua was removed 
from his father and then returned to his father.”  Id. at 918.  
Thus, “Anthony and Latasha would not have been exposed to 
the dangers from their father but for the affirmative acts of the 
state; the same cannot be said for Joshua in DeShaney.”  Id. 
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qualified immunity, the court concluded that a reasonable 
state official at the time would have known that “reckless, 
conscience shocking conduct that altered the status quo and 
placed a child at substantial risk of serious, immediate, and 
proximate harm was unconstitutional.”87  The Tenth Circuit 
had previously held that the parents of a special education 
student who committed suicide established a state-created 
danger claim when school officials sent the student home 
after he was acting up in school, despite knowing that he was 
having suicidal thoughts, he had access to firearms in his 
house, and his parents were not home.88 
 
 Against this backdrop, we conclude that the state of 
the law in 2013 was sufficiently clear to put Littlejohn on 
notice that permitting a kindergarten student to leave his 
classroom with an unidentified adult could lead to a 
deprivation of that student’s substantive due process rights.89 
                                              
87 Id. at 924. 
88 Armijo by and through Chavez v. Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 
159 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998). 
89 See also Frances-Colon v. Ramirez, 107 F.3d 62, 63-64 
(1st Cir. 1997) (explaining that a substantive due process 
violation occurs when a state actor “affirmatively acts to 
increase the threat of harm to the claimant or affirmatively 
prevents the individual from receiving assistance”); Pinder v. 
Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1177 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[S]tate actors 
may not disclaim liability when they themselves throw others 
to the lions.”); Sciotto v. Marple Newton Sch. Dist., 81 F. 
Supp. 2d 559, 570 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (concluding that “it was 
clearly established . . . that a student enjoy[s] a constitutional 
right to be free from school officials’ deliberate indifference 
to, or acts that increase the risk of serious injury from[,] 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
 State-created danger cases often involve unsettling 
facts and this case is no different.  Even so, our resolution of 
the legal issues is straightforward.  Exposing a young child to 
an obvious danger is the quintessential example of when 
qualified immunity should not shield a public official from 
suit.  Accordingly, the order of the District Court is affirmed. 
                                                                                                     
unjustified invasions of bodily integrity perpetrated by third 
parties”). 
 
